Discussions about Iran usually start with the wrong question. Who will come to power? Masoud Pezeshkian, or Reza Pahlavi? From this perspective, Pezeshkian and Reza Pahlavi represent not two different political paths, but two different false expectations. What is the West's view on this issue? Let's first take a look at that.
According to the West, Pezeshkian is within the system. He can be elected, he can speak, he can address social and economic problems. But this does not mean real power. The Iranian presidency functions more as a political shock absorber than an executive institution. Dissatisfaction is directed from society towards the president, but the decision-making mechanism is not given to him. Foreign policy, security, the army, and strategic economy are outside the president's purview. For this reason, Pezeshkian's real chance is not to seize power. His role is not to change the system, but to keep the system manageable.
Western analysts believe that this is a “managed presidency”. That is, he is not the decision-maker, but a figure who explains the outcomes of decisions.
Reza Pahlavi, on the other hand, stands in a completely opposite position. He is not within the system, and this is his weak point.
He lacks a real political organization, internal mechanism, and power bases in Iran. But at the same time, this is his relative advantage. Because all centers of power within the system are experiencing a serious legitimacy crisis.
Western analysts' view of Reza Pahlavi is pragmatic. They evaluate him not as a leader who will immediately come to power, but as a transitional figure. If the existing system collapses internally, fragments, or becomes unable to govern itself, Reza Pahlavi could be a symbol of national reconciliation and the face of a referendum process. But this scenario is only possible under one condition: if the security apparatus accepts him. At this point, all analyses converge on the same center: SEPAH.
SEPAH's power does not stem solely from weapons. Its main strength lies in being a parallel system of power established beneath the state. Iran is not a classic state model. In this country, the army, economy, and security are concentrated in the same center, and this center thrives not on ideological but on structural power. SEPAH is not just a military institution. It is also a major economic actor. The oil sector, construction, logistics, ports, and banking mechanisms are linked to this structure. The material dependence of thousands of families relies on this system. This makes it indissoluble. Furthermore, SEPAH generates internal legitimacy through a narrative of external threat. Regional tension, confrontation with the West, and a siege mentality are the main arguments for this institution remaining in power internally. Without this mechanism, the Iranian regime would struggle to maintain control over society. It is precisely for this reason that the West still prefers to see Iran as a whole system. However, if this system collapses, Iran could turn into a map of national neighborhoods rather than a unified state. Turks in the north could act in their own interests with Azerbaijan and Turkey, the highly prepared Kurds in the west with regional Kurdish structures, Arabs in Khuzestan with the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, and Balochis along the Pakistan border. The Balochis are the poorest people in Iran. Pakistan also fears Baloch separatists living in its territory.
This scenario is more complex and more dangerous than Yugoslavia. The West does not openly discuss this possibility, because the fragmentation of Iran means not managed weakness, but unmanageable chaos. But if the system collapses, ethnic neighborhoods will no longer be a possibility, but a consequence.
The division of Iran into neighborhoods will re-ignite existing separatist movements in the West. If the West openly sends a message of “self-determination” to the peoples of Iran, this precedent will harm the West itself in Spain, Belgium, France, Great Britain...
The number of separatist movements acknowledged by the West within its own territory is close to 100. In reality, it is more than 200...
Against the backdrop of this reality, the conclusion is simple. Pezeshkian cannot change SEPAH. Reza Pahlavi, on the other hand, cannot come to power without SEPAH. According to the West's view, there will be changing names in Iran. The unchanging structure will remain. Hopes will be tied to individuals, but this mechanism will determine Iran's fate.
Iran's problem is not who comes to power. The problem is who SEPAH will greenlight to come to power. That is, the new leader will be determined not by the people, but by the system. And the system is tied to SEPAH. In Iran, the problem is not who comes to power, but where power is concentrated. Of course, the West's perspective is primarily shaped by Western interests. This is clear. It is also clear that revolution has an inexplicable logic. That is, no voiced prediction can be confined to mere conjecture or assumption. In other words, a revolution could reset not only the mullah regime but also SEPAH...
As Azerbaijan, what is important for us is to emerge victorious as a nation from the events unfolding in Iran. For this, it is necessary to adopt a rational stance during the course of these processes...
Iran has long been in a state of managed chaos. It has now reached an unmanageable level. What will happen next is not precisely clear. What is clear is that the mullah regime's main line is this: to calm society, not to change the system. That is, they want to freeze the crisis situation by preventing a revolutionary explosion. Previously, the mullahs succeeded in this. This time, however, it seems impossible...
Elbay Hasanli,
Zurich
