Discussions about Iran's future are no longer confined to Tehran. "Post-Iran" scenarios, especially the topic of federalism, directly concern the geopolitical balance of the Turkic world. This is because Iran is not solely composed of Persians. Millions of Azerbaijanis, Turkmens, Qashqai, and Khorasan Turks live in this country, and Iran's stabilization is impossible without a change in their status.
In my previous article, I examined the prospects of the Yugoslav variant in Iran. This time, we will focus on other models.
If Iran federalizes, what does this process mean for Turkey and the Turkic world?
We will try to answer this question. Federalism means managed change, not fragmentation. This state model is often mistakenly presented as “the weakening of the state.” However, global experience shows that multinational countries either survive by federalizing or face the risk of disintegration due to centralism.
For Iran, federalism means a real division of powers between the center and the regions within a unified state, the recognition of ethnic identities not as a security problem but as a legal reality, and the replacement of violence with constitutional mechanisms. There are countries where this model works: Germany, Switzerland, Canada. None of them disintegrated because they federalized. On the contrary, they brought internal tensions under control.
Within Iran, the largest and politically most sensitive Turkic community is the Turks of South Azerbaijan. They have accepted neither monarchy nor theocracy. This is because both models were Persian-centric and systematically denied Turkic identity.
In a federal Iran scenario, South Azerbaijan could bring demands such as education in the mother tongue, a regional parliament, and control over local economic resources onto the agenda within a unified state. This is also critical for Turkey. Because through South Azerbaijan, relations along the Turkey–Caucasus–Caspian–Central Asia line could shift from a security risk to a plane of legal and economic cooperation.
There is also an often overlooked, but strategically important issue: Iranian Turkmens. They are located east of the Caspian Sea, along a direct line of connection with Turkmenistan. A federal model could grant Iranian Turkmens the status of a cultural and political subject, transform Ashgabat–Tehran relations from ideological tension into regional cooperation, and strengthen stability in the Caspian basin. This also represents a strategic advantage for Turkey's relations with Turkestan.
Can you imagine a federalized, yet Persian-centric Iran? However, one point should not be romanticized. Even if Iran federalizes, Persian-centric political reflexes will not automatically disappear. Tehran may continue to view the integration of the Turkic world with suspicion, balance Turkey's regional role, and see Turkic regions as “channels of foreign influence.” In other words, federalization does not automatically create a “Turkic world-friendly Iran.” But it brings about a more significant change: it transforms Iran into a predictable actor operating within a legal framework.
So when would confederation come onto the agenda? If federalism remains formal, if a real division of powers does not occur, and if distrust persists, then the discussion of confederation becomes inevitable. This model is a structure where the unified state is effectively weakened, regions gain a status close to sovereignty, and the center remains solely in a coordinating role.
History shows that confederation is usually not the first choice, but the final outcome. The USA experienced this in the 18th century, while the European Union today operates with a structure close to a confederal logic.
For Turkey and the Turkic world, the main question is not whether Iran will federalize. The main question is this: Will Iran accept Turkic identity as a real political subject? If the answer is “yes,” regional stability will strengthen, Turkey–Turkic world relations will expand, and Iran will cease to be a source of internal conflict. If the answer remains uncertain, federalism will merely become a means of buying time, and harsher scenarios will emerge.
From this perspective, Iran's future is a strategic process that not only Tehran but also Ankara must closely monitor. Because the outcome of this process will affect the entire Turkic world, particularly through Iranian Turks and South Azerbaijan.
Elbay Hasanli,
Zurich
