The elections to be held in Armenia are not merely an internal political event. These elections are a decision that will directly impact the security architecture of the South Caucasus. This is precisely why Azerbaijan and Turkey, avoiding open statements, are pursuing the same strategic line: to create conditions for Nikol Pashinyan to win silently. This is not a matter of sympathy. This is a calculation based on the alternatives being more dangerous.
Pashinyan is neither pro-Azerbaijan nor pro-Turkey. He is a leader who lost the war within Armenia but has accepted reality. His main difference is that he is not like the revanchists: Pashinyan knows that a new war would be suicide for Armenia.
For Baku and Ankara, the main issue is not who Pashinyan is, but what his alternatives offer. The alternatives are clear: the Karabakh clan, pro-Moscow figures, “lost territories” rhetoric, and new tensions.
Openly supporting Pashinyan would present him in Armenia as a “Turkish project.” This would strengthen nationalist mobilization, facilitate Moscow's interference in the election, and weaken Pashinyan internally. Therefore, Baku and Ankara do not speak, they act. Politics is conducted not through statements, but by creating an environment.
Silent support works in several directions.
Firstly, it is about portraying the alternative as dangerous. Baku and Ankara, by keeping their rhetoric low, strengthen Pashinyan's main argument: “If I am not here, war will return.” Revanchists appear not as show heroes, but as a real risk.
Secondly, it is about keeping the prospect of normalization open. Turkey's not completely closing the normalization line with Armenia, and Azerbaijan's keeping the peace agenda on the table, sends an indirect message to Armenian voters: exiting the blockade is only possible through this line.
Thirdly, it is about sending economic signals, but not unconditionally. Neither Ankara nor Baku gives “gifts.” It is simply shown that joining regional projects is only possible with a conflict-free course. This portrays Pashinyan as a “results-producing leader.”
The Russia factor is decisive in this process. If the election is presented as a confrontation between Turkey and Azerbaijan with Russia, Pashinyan will lose. Therefore, Baku and Ankara remain silent, creating conditions for arguments defending Pashinyan to emerge from within Armenia itself.
This is precisely the scenario Moscow fears most: Armenia making decisions from within. Pashinyan's victory is not the end, but the beginning. If a grand peace show is staged immediately after the election, revanchists will strengthen the “betrayal” narrative. Therefore, a phased approach is also a key condition here. Consequently, Baku and Ankara do not support Pashinyan because they love him. They keep him silent because his alternatives are more dangerous. The short formula for this policy is: the best way to support Pashinyan is not to openly support him. In the South Caucasus, sometimes the most effective policy is one conducted without words...
Elbay Hasanli
