Amidst the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in the Middle East, one of the most significant events in Iran's political system occurred: the Assembly of Experts, representing the country's religious-political elite, elected Mojtaba Khamenei as the country's new supreme leader. This decision was made against the backdrop of both the ongoing military confrontation in the region and the political crisis within Iran.
Modern.az reminds that the election of the new leader is not merely a change of power. It is an indicator of Iran's future foreign policy course and which line it will choose in the US-Israel confrontation.
Although 56-year-old Mojtaba Khamenei remained in the shadow of his father – Iran's previous supreme leader Ali Khamenei – for many years, he is considered an important figure in the country's political-security system. He is reported to have particularly close ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran.
He was long called a “shadow leader”. He was considered one of the key figures influencing decision-making in his father's office and holds significant influence within Iran's security apparatus.
However, his election is also considered a paradoxical event in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is because one of the main ideas of the 1979 revolution was the abolition of the monarchy, but now power has effectively been transferred within the family.
Iran is experiencing one of the most complex periods in its history at the moment the new leader comes to power.
The country is facing several parallel crises: military confrontation with the US and Israel, severe economic sanctions, high inflation and currency depreciation, and social discontent, waves of protest.
Even before the war began, Iran was experiencing a serious economic crisis, and this situation creates significant risks for the new government.
In such circumstances, a key dilemma arises for Tehran: to continue ideological resistance, or to seek tactical compromises to prevent the collapse of the state.
Although Tehran ideologically demonstrates its continuation of a “resistance” policy, from a realpolitik perspective, it seems very difficult for Iran to sustain a full-scale and long-term war.
There are several main reasons for this.
1. Economic resilience is limited. Sanctions and war weaken the Iranian economy. As pressure on energy exports and the financial system increases, the country's internal stability is put at risk.
2. Weakening of regional allies. Iran's proxy forces, which are instruments of regional influence – particularly structures in Lebanon and Syria – are taking continuous blows. This complicates Tehran's regional strategy.
3. Limited military capabilities. Iran lags far behind both the US and Israel technologically. Its Air Defense Forces and Naval Forces have been virtually destroyed. The only real source of threat – ballistic missile and drone reserves – is diminishing.
4. The main priority for the regime is the preservation of power. For the Iranian political system, the continuity of power is more important than ideology. If the regime feels its existence is threatened, it may shift to a more pragmatic policy.
Although Mojtaba Khamenei is known as a hardline figure, this does not necessarily mean he will absolutely refuse compromise.
History shows that the Iranian government can take tactical steps back at critical moments. The most famous example of this was the nuclear agreement signed in 2015.
For this reason, although Tehran demonstrates resistance in its official rhetoric, it may keep diplomatic channels open in the background. This implies a possible compromise with the US and Israel.
The first signs of this rational approach are already beginning to appear. For example, although Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei was killed on February 28, Tehran did not take one of the most radical steps - closing the Strait of Hormuz, which is vital for the global energy market. Yet, in Iran's military doctrine, such a step was presented as one of the harshest response mechanisms in a state of war.
Furthermore, in recent days, the intensity of Iran's drone and missile attacks directed at the region has noticeably decreased. Tehran understands that further escalation of the confrontation could strain relations not only with the US and Israel but also with neighboring states in the region. Open dissatisfaction with Iran's irrational and aggressive actions is already felt in several regional capitals, including Baku and Ankara.
Another important factor is the position of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran's main power structure. Although SEPAH is presented as a proponent of a hardline ideological stance, its leadership is also interested in preserving the existing system and its own positions. In other words, this structure also effectively prioritizes a strategy of “survival and maintaining the system”.
For this very reason, it can be assumed that Mojtaba Khamenei, designated as the new supreme leader, will try to establish a balance based on mutual interests with SEPAH. The essence of this balance is simple: the security elite protects the system, while the political leadership tries to extricate it from international pressure.
In the initial phase of Mojtaba Khamenei's rule, three main lines are expected: stricter control and repression domestically, a show of force and symbolic military responses in the region, and concurrently, de-escalation of tensions through diplomatic channels.
This model could serve to both preserve Iran's ideological stance and prevent the collapse of the state.
The election of Iran's new supreme leader marks the beginning of a new phase for the region. Although Mojtaba Khamenei is known as a hardliner, Tehran is forced to reckon with reality.
Iran will ideologically demonstrate resistance, but seeing the risk of state collapse, it will try to avoid a full-scale and long-term war.
Because Tehran knows well: in this war, there is a possibility of not only military but also political and economic defeat. And precisely for this reason, Iran will not fight to the end – it is aware of what it stands to lose.
Modern Analysis and Research Group
