One of the political theses most circulated in the region in recent months is the idea that it is allegedly Turkey's turn after Iran. This statement, while appearing emotional at first glance, actually carries a serious geopolitical and psychological impact mechanism. Such sentences do not arise by chance. They are the product of information warfare, perception management, and mass psychological manipulation. For this very reason, the answer to the question must be given from the perspective of deterrence, regional balance, and strategic communication, free from emotions.
Turkey is a NATO member, has been within the Alliance since 1952, and this legal status also constitutes a broad security framework. NATO currently has 32 members. These 32 members are parts of a system of common defense planning, political consultation, intelligence coordination, and interoperability. NATO's fundamental principle is collective defense. According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all.
This article stipulates the obligation of each ally to provide assistance to the country under attack. The form of assistance is not limited to tanks or missiles; political support, military logistics, air defense, intelligence, command and control, maritime security, and other means are also included within this framework.
In fact, the answer to the question of what NATO membership provides is multifaceted. Firstly, it offers security guarantees. Secondly, it increases military-political weight. Thirdly, it raises the cost of attack for potential adversaries. Fourthly, it complicates strategic isolation. Fifthly, it enables member states to act through a coalition mechanism. In other words, NATO membership is not merely a matter of flag and protocol, but a real power multiplier. NATO membership also creates obligations.
Member states must demonstrate political solidarity, act in accordance with common security objectives, enhance defense capabilities, and participate in joint planning. NATO's official mechanisms also include the principle of common funding and burden-sharing. Furthermore, in recent years, demands regarding defense expenditures have been more stringently on the agenda. At the 2025 Hague Summit, allies undertook new commitments to increase defense and security spending until 2035. This means that NATO membership is as much about "entering under the umbrella" as it is about bearing the responsibility of supporting that umbrella.
So, what is the duty of other NATO members if one faces a threat? They immediately perceive it as a common security problem. It is at this point that collective security diverges from individual security. NATO's legal logic is that pressure on one member is a test for the entire alliance system. For this reason, any escalation involving a geostrategic pivotal country like Turkey is not limited to Ankara alone. It affects a broad security belt extending from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and from the South Caucasus to the Middle East.
Now, let's turn to the main question: why is it often said that it is Turkey's turn after Iran? According to analysts, this is primarily an area where geopolitical fantasy, disinformation production, and threat construction converge.
Turkey is not Iran. Turkey is neither in the same position in the international system, nor part of the same alliances, nor does it stand in the same strategic configuration. Iran is more often described within a framework of sanctions, isolation, proxy networks, and a security plane.
Turkey, on the other hand, is a NATO member, a regional power, a state with a developing industrial-military complex, and multi-level relations with Europe, the Black Sea, the Middle East, and the Turkic world. Therefore, the phrase "Turkey after Iran" should be read not as an analytical judgment, but as a political-psychological influence tool.
Whose imagination is this?
Firstly, information circles within or close to Iran might try to gain additional legitimacy for themselves with such a thesis. The logic is simple: if the threat is not only directed at us but also at Turkey tomorrow, then the idea emerges that today's tension is not solely an Iranian issue. This is an attempt to garner sympathy, form a new opinion, and point to a new target. In other words, the aim might be to soften isolation by sharing the threat. In such narratives, a psychology of "shared victimhood" is produced.
Secondly, forces within Turkey that are opposed to Turkey might speculate on this topic. This refers to circles engaged in ideological confrontation, seeking to pressure the government, attempting to portray security policy as unsuccessful, or working on the public opinion's nervous system. They might try to delegitimize the government's foreign policy course through the thesis that "the country is under great risk." This is a classic example of domestic political instrumentalization. Fear, uncertainty, and strategic panic become the material for internal polemics.
Thirdly, major powers or media ecosystems associated with major powers might use this information to keep Turkey out of the game in the Middle East. This is because Turkey is not only a military actor in the region but also a diplomatic mediator, a transit point for energy routes, a transit country, and a center of political influence. One way to weaken Ankara's regional initiative is to tie its attention to a continuous discourse of threat.
Thus, state resources might be dragged from a proactive strategy into a reactive defense psychology. This also limits geopolitical maneuver capabilities.
So, what do they think in Turkey?
In Turkey, diplomats, military personnel, experts, journalists, and society do not all think alike. Diplomatic circles usually approach such theses with caution and emphasize legal-strategic differences.
Military personnel measure the issue with risk matrices, hybrid threats, and border security deterrence parameters. Experts interpret this topic in the context of geopolitical perception, information manipulation, and regional power balance.
Journalists, on the other hand, mostly reflect the daily political emotion and the temperature of public opinion.
Within society, two parallel lines are visible: one side considers this a serious threat, while the other regards it entirely as a psychological operation.
After all this, the question arises: are these ideas a game or a reality? The most accurate answer is that this is a political game carrying elements of reality. That is, the region is indeed full of risks, but the form of presenting the risk is often manipulative. There is a fine line between a real threat and an exaggerated threat. The point is that information warfare deliberately blurs that line. For this reason, the thesis "it's Turkey's turn" should neither be naively accepted nor completely ridiculed. It needs to be deciphered.
History also shows that alliances are institutions of political will parallel to military treaties. Winston Churchill said in the mid-20th century that security is protected not only by weapons but also by foresight.
This idea remains valid today. Because the way a threat is presented creates strategic consequences, as much as the threat itself.
Sun Tzu's famous thesis also comes to mind here; he said that the greatest victory is that which is won without fighting.
In modern times, this "victory without fighting" is often sought through disinformation, psychological attrition, and perception superiority.
The question of when NATO has remained silent when operations began against one of its members is also frequently asked. The essence of NATO is consensus and collective reaction, but this reaction is not always in the same format.
When a threat arises to any member, NATO can resort to steps such as political consultation, deployment of additional forces, activation of defense plans, air and sea patrols, and intelligence coordination. In other words, the concept of "remaining silent" is often a superficial interpretation; sometimes, behind apparent silence lies extensive military-political coordination. This is also the peculiarity of the Alliance; reaction is not limited to mere statements.
Have two NATO member countries ever gone to war?
The answer is that, to date, no open and full-scale intra-NATO war has occurred. However, there have been tensions, severe crises, and even confrontations that reached the brink of armed incidents. The most frequently recalled example is the extremely dangerous escalation between Greece and Turkey in the context of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Nevertheless, a war between two NATO members has not taken place. This fact itself demonstrates the importance of intra-alliance crisis management, de-escalation mechanisms, and political channels.
After all this, we can say that the thesis "it's Turkey's turn after Iran" appears more as a disinformation narrative, a psychological influence tool, and geopolitical speculation. This thesis may serve the interests of various actors, Iran's attempt to gather support for itself, the manipulation of anti-Turkey or anti-government circles within Turkey, as well as the plans of major powers to push Ankara into a cautious and defensive position in the regional game.
However, in no case does all this mean that Turkey is a weak target. On the contrary, Turkey, as a NATO member, a regional power, and a strategic nodal state, possesses a distinct security status. Therefore, equating Turkey with Iran is both an analytical error and political manipulation. The correct approach is not panic, but cool-headed strategic analysis. The future of the region is not determined by fear-mongering statements, but by the balance of power, diplomatic rationalism, and information literacy.
For this very reason, the most important question of the day is not "whose turn is it?", but "who is circulating this question and why?"
Elnur AMIROV
