Fazil Mustafa
Some Notes on Iran
Are the events in Iran a revolution? I believe not. This form of protest, lacking theory and program, can be considered a mass social unrest. The risk of foreign intervention is high; if this materializes, a change of regime is possible. In the current global conjuncture, the fragmentation of Iran would not serve the interests of the US and Great Britain, who have the most connections with the region. Israel, on the other hand, would not want this at all. Just as states like Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan remained in the hands of regional authorities, and although these elements still retain their influence, none of these countries were allowed to fragment. You can view Iran according to this scenario from now on. Time is needed for the politicization of the market-centric bourgeoisie. The religious formula of belief will again easily suppress the calls for dialogue from the intellectual guild. The probability of civil war breaking out is high. In any case, the democratization of this country is nothing but an illusion. Because here, the main class yesterday, today, and tomorrow will be the clerical elite. Even if they are not in political power, the spiritual authority of mullahs, sayyids, and sorcerers over a largely uneducated society will always maintain its influence. That is, here Sheikh Nasrullah will always be in the majority, and Kefli Isgandar in solitude.
To understand Iranian psychology, I would recommend reading Muhammad Asad's "The Road to Mecca". There is a direct proportionality between the mindset carriers of Safavidism in our country and the Khomeinist-Khameneist mindset carriers in Iran. If we do not analyze the process by detaching ourselves from the South Azerbaijan mythology imposed on us by Stalin, we may once again direct our compatriots there towards meaningless goals. In Iran, reforms in religious, political, national, and social policies, led by the current president, do not seem possible. Because any reform means limiting the mullahs' power and subjecting it to law, and it is not credible that a stratum with vast material and human resources would allow this. This means that a regime change could sweep away the entire elite. In that case, the restoration of a monarchy is more likely than a republic not based on Sharia law.
Like all entities commenting on the events in Iran today, I also lack comprehensive knowledge about Iran's internal elements and their real influence; I am merely trying to determine what our perspective might be as a politician who considers the interests of the Azerbaijani state.
Our main expectation is the establishment of a secular state in Iran. This can be established by the Iranian bourgeoisie, or ensured by a Shah monarchy – for us, it should not make much difference. The priority is Iran's liberation from religious-sectarian fascism. This will also create an opportunity for the cleansing of the Iranian ideological virus located in the underlying layers of our state. In principle, any secular state should not have an interest in spending so much money on spreading such a sick ideology.
There will no longer be an obstacle to establishing relations with all neighbors based on pragmatic interests. Our second perspective is the non-violation of Iran's territorial integrity. Naturally, the recognition of the fundamental components of our compatriots' national rights there is desirable, but let us not forget that interested states, as in Iraq and Syria, will try to realize their main alliance through the Kurdish factor, and this could seriously harm the interests of Azerbaijanis. Therefore, reaching an agreement with Kurdish leaders from now on, regarding the non-infringement of each other's interests, would reduce the risk of confrontation. Thirdly, in the event of a civil war, the regulation of the refugee flow should concern us and Turkey from now on. Of course, we must support our compatriots, but under no circumstances should we allow processes that would threaten our internal security.
Recent statements indicate that the US openly declares its role as an opposing party to the regime in the events in Iran, and this is a sufficiently important basis for the dramatization of the events to increase. But will there be a landing on the ground? The answer to such a question, just as Maduro did not know it beforehand in South America, no one in our region knows either.
