Azerbaijan declared its independence in 1991. Iran, however, responded to this independence not with tanks, but with screens - “Səhər Azəri” became the first ideological front of that response.
Azerbaijan declared its independence in October 1991. This date was not merely a political act for the region. It was a shift in ideological boundaries. And Iran understood this sooner than anyone else. Therefore, immediately after Azerbaijan gained independence, in 1992, the “Səhər Azəri” channel, broadcasting in Azeri Turkish from Iran, began its operations. This chronological sequence is not a coincidence. This is an instinctive state reaction.
“Səhər Azəri” is the Azerbaijani language service of the “Səhər” international broadcasting network, affiliated with the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). The channel has been broadcasting continuously since 1992, and its line has not changed throughout these years. Only the form of rhetoric has changed. The essence, however, has remained constant: to weaken the idea of an independent Azerbaijan, presenting it not as a sovereign actor but as a controlled object.
Here, a key question arises: Is “Səhər Azəri” Iran's first foreign-language media project? No. Iran had previously conducted radio and television broadcasts in Arabic. But the difference lies here. Broadcasts directed at the Arab world were built upon sectarianism. Shia ideology was the main weapon. However, regarding Azerbaijan, sectarianism was not sufficient. Here, national identity, statehood, language, and history converged. For the first time, Iran was confronted with national identity on this scale.
Precisely for this reason, “Səhər Azəri” represented a new stage in Iran's information strategy. This was the first time that Tehran targeted a specific people, a specific state, and a specific national memory at the television level. It is noteworthy that during that period, Iran did not have international ideological television broadcasts at this level in Kurdish, Turkmen, or other ethnic languages. There were radio programs for Kurds, but a systematic, externally oriented ideological platform at the television level was first established in Azeri Turkish.
This fact clearly demonstrates one thing. The threat for Iran is not the Turkish language. The threat for Iran is the independent state of Azerbaijan. Because this state represents an alternative political model for millions of Azeris living in Iran. There can be a state, the language can be a state language, there can be an army, there can be a secular system. This idea shakes Tehran's ideological foundations.
The line of “Səhər Azəri” also proves this. For years, the channel has been circulating the same theses. Azerbaijan is allegedly not sovereign. It is allegedly a project of the West and Israel. Azerbaijan is in Turkey's shadow. The Karabakh victory is either downplayed or presented as a regional risk. The secular state model is portrayed as a weakness of faith. The Iranian model, on the other hand, is indirectly presented as the “true path”. This is a classic technique of ideological erosion.
Iran builds its strategy in information warfare according to languages.
It attacks Azeris through national identity. While for the Arab audience, it does so through sectarianism. In channels broadcasting in Arabic, Saudi Arabia is presented as a puppet of the West, the Sunni world is delegitimized, and Iran portrays itself as the center of the axis of resistance. In other words, it casts doubt on the statehood of Azeris, while selling the claim of religious leadership to Arabs.
At this point, an interesting asymmetry emerges. Does Saudi Arabia conduct ideological television broadcasts in Persian targeting Iranian society? No. There is no such strategy at the state level. Saudi Arabia engages in interstate competition with Iran, but it does not pursue a policy of division based on languages and ethnic identities. This also indicates that Iran's approach is more aggressive, but at the same time, more dangerous.
The methods of “Səhər Azəri” are also familiar. These methods overlap with those once used by “Sputnik Azerbaijan” as well as some Western propaganda platforms. The difference is in ideology; the method is the same. To question sovereignty, to portray national decisions as foreign influence, to create internal division in society. The channel rarely names specific individuals. Instead, it creates categories such as “certain circles in Baku media”, “Azeri writers living abroad”, “Pan-Turkist analysts”. This is a classic technique of security schools.
In this entire landscape, the most painful point is the void in Azerbaijan. Today, there is no institutional media center in Azerbaijan that systematically explains the idea of a unified Azerbaijan to an international audience, rationally and within the framework of statehood. There are individual voices, but no central hub. However, the establishment of such a center could put Iran in an ideologically desperate situation. Because the idea of a unified Azerbaijan is not separatism; it is memory. History speaks, not borders. And Tehran finds it difficult to respond to this idea.
The idea of a unified Azerbaijan is not a military threat for Iran. It is an ideological nightmare. Because this idea transcends sectarianism, transcends language, and questions the monolithic nature of the state. The most dangerous aspect is that this idea can be presented not as an emotional slogan, but as a rational political concept.
Iran's weakest ideological point lies precisely here. The regime cannot reconcile with national identity. It perceives ethnic diversity only as a threat. It cannot offer a unified, attractive political model. The terrible events that have occurred in Iran in recent days have once again revealed this simple truth. It is precisely Azeri identity that most clearly exposes this weakness.
If Azerbaijan wants to gain an advantage on the information front, it must be proactive, not reactive. The Western thought mechanism has long proven this. To build its own narrative, combine facts with analysis, and present value and interest simultaneously. To protect the national idea without deviating from statehood. Media should produce not just news, but meanings.
The fact that “Səhər Azəri” has remained active from 1992 until today reveals a truth. For Iran, the Azerbaijan problem has not ended. Only its form has changed. Today, the problem is not Azerbaijan's existence, but its ideological appeal...
Elbay Hasanli,
Zurich
