The answer to this question lies neither in soft terms like “Kurdish opening” nor in daily political polemics. The answer lies in the state's security rationale and the correct timing. Recent events in Turkey have shown that Ankara is no longer in a phase of tactical maneuvering on this issue, but rather in a phase of strategic closure. It is precisely at this point that the CHP again failed to correctly assess the process.
When security issues come to the forefront in Turkey, there is a recurring scenario. The state takes action, results are formed on the ground, the regional balance shifts, and the opposition, as the process nears completion, enters a phase of ethical and ideological protest. This is not merely a tactical error. This is a problem that demonstrates why the CHP's security reflex structurally fails to function.
The essence of the problem is simple: the profound difference between state rationality and opposition psychology.
State rationality evaluates security through the lens of time, space, and the balance of power. Opposition psychology, however, assesses it through interpretations of intent, ethical categories, and past traumas. When these two perspectives clash, the opposition almost always lags behind.
The recent PKK process clearly demonstrated this difference. This time, Turkey approached the PKK issue not with the logic of “let's talk and see what happens,” but with the rationale of “let's close it and be done with it.” First, the issue was concluded in the region, then the domestic political discourse changed. Without the practical dismantling of the PKK's military-political strongholds in Syria, neither the İmralı issue nor domestic de-escalation could have come onto the agenda. This sequence is the working mechanism of classic state rationality.
This line has been openly expressed for years by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: “Terror is not negotiated with, but fought against.” Although this sentence was often presented as a slogan, it was in fact a summary of a long-term strategy. Turkey first waged the struggle on the ground, then moved to the political phase. Negotiations emerged not as a result of weakness, but of superiority.
The same state rationality is clearly visible in Devlet Bahçeli's approach. Bahçeli had expressed the harshest stance regarding the PKK for years. His transition to a more measured political language in the final stage is not a concession. This is a political confirmation that the threat on the ground has ended. For state rationality, taboos are preserved while the threat persists, and they change when the threat is eliminated.
The CHP, however, again failed to correctly assess this stage. The rhetoric of the CHP leadership regarding “the table,” “the threat to the unitary structure,” and “betrayal” expresses old fears, not reality. Yet, there is no table. The field was closed before any table could be set. The CHP still automatically interprets dialogue as weakness. The state, on the other hand, views dialogue only as a technical stage possible after the threat has been eliminated.
The opposition's problem is deeper. The CHP still evaluates security either as the army's job or as a trauma from the 1990s. However, in a modern state, security is the simultaneous management of diplomacy, regional balance, migration, energy lines, and the psychological environment. The state understands this multifaceted system well. The opposition, however, only sees the noise.
For this reason, the CHP always remains in a reactive position on security issues. It protests when the process begins, and says “we told you so” when the process ends. But being right is not enough in the field of security. One must be right at the right time.
Contacts concerning the DEM Party and İmralı are also misinterpreted in this context. The goal here is not to legitimize the PKK. On the contrary, it is to dismantle its ideological foundations. For an organization whose armed force no longer remains on the ground, the influence of its ideological center gradually becomes meaningless. Ankara is precisely managing this stage.
Thus, Turkey is now closing the PKK issue because, for the first time, three conditions have been met simultaneously: regional military strongholds have been dismantled, the internal security balance has been established, and political risks have been reduced to a manageable level. This is not an opening. This is a closure phase.
There is a paradoxical reality in Turkish politics. The opposition can speak on topics such as democracy, law, economy, and social justice, but when it comes to security issues, it becomes tongue-tied. It either remains silent, delays, or voices accusations unrelated to reality. The reason for this is not solely the power of the ruling party. The main reason is that the opposition is still looking for its understanding of security in the wrong place.
Consequently, this process is neither a romantic search for peace nor a repetition of the past. This is the state's attempt to close the problem. Because the CHP fails to perceive this reality, it remains on the sidelines once again. Erdoğan and Bahçeli, despite coming from different political backgrounds, converge in the same state rationality. And precisely for this reason, the process moves forward, while accusations remain in the air.
Elbay Hasanli,
Zurich
