Turkey's “Yeni Şafak” newspaper highlighted a striking remark by former US Ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack: Europe wants Turkey to protect Europe, but it does not want Turkey to possess the best military technology. This sentence is more than just a quote. It is a clear diagnosis of Europe–Turkey relations.
For many years, Europe has viewed Turkey as NATO's southeastern shield. It is precisely Turkey that prevents migration waves, contains the chaos in the Middle East, and stands on the front line in the security balance of the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. The real burden of European security is borne not by Brussels, but by Ankara. However, a strong army is not measured solely by the number of soldiers. A strong army means an independent defense industry, technology, intelligence, and most importantly, freedom of decision-making. It is at this point that Europe's double standards become apparent.
Europe wants Turkey to be at the forefront of NATO operations, but to be excluded from the F-35 program. Turkey should play the role of a shield against Russia, but face sanctions for acquiring S-400s. Turkey should hold back migrants, but when it builds its own air defense system, this creates “concern.” This approach is not an alliance, but a model of functional exploitation. This is precisely the essence of Tom Barrack's message from years ago. Turkey's security is Europe's security, but an approach that seeks to keep Turkey weak is strategically absurd. If Europe truly desires a strategic ally, it must accept Turkey not as a partial power, but as a full-fledged military-political actor. Turkey's steps in the defense industry in recent years are a result of this reality. Bayraktar, ANKA, Kızılelma, national missiles, and naval platforms have emerged not against Europe, but in response to Europe's insincere attitude. Ankara is no longer an actor waiting for permission, but one that designs its own security.
The West's attitude towards Turkey has a structural, not an emotional, problem. The problem is not with Erdoğan, not with specific policies, nor even with the rhetoric of democracy. The problem is that as Turkey strengthens, the role the West has assigned to it crumbles. For many years, the ideal Turkey for the West was imagined as: a country that bears the burden of security but does not formulate strategy; provides soldiers but does not make decisions; is a bridge but does not choose a direction. That is, a functional actor with limited sovereignty. This model no longer works.
As Turkey strengthened, the first thing to be disrupted was the security hierarchy. Within NATO, there was an unwritten rule: technology comes from the West, and operations are transferred to the field. Turkey closed this chapter. When it began producing its own UAVs, missiles, and naval platforms, it wasn't just about weapons. It was about ending dependence. When dependence ends, the mechanism of obedience also collapses. This is the primary reason for the West's frustration: an uncontrollable ally.
The second reason is deeper: the fear of example. Turkey has shown that it is possible to cooperate with the West while not being under the West's dictate. One can be a NATO member and engage in parallel discussions with Russia, Ukraine, and the Middle East. Europe's “either you are with us, or you are against us” logic fails at this point. This model does not only not work for Turkey. It is becoming an alternative roadmap for the Balkans, the Black Sea basin, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. It is precisely here that Europe's nerves are stretched taut.
The third reason is geopolitical weight. Turkey is no longer changing the game solely due to its geographical position, but also through its decisions. In processes from Karabakh to the Black Sea, from Ukraine to the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara is not an external observer. This weakens Europe's claim to be the sole normative center in the region. Therefore, as Turkey strengthens, the same scenario repeats. Threats increase, the rhetoric of arms embargoes intensifies, and mechanisms of political pressure are activated under the guise of democracy. These are not matters of principle. These are control reflexes. The European Union considers Turkey necessary for its own security, but does not want it to be a full power. Because a fully powerful Turkey no longer stands on the periphery, but in a parallel center.
The same paradox exists within NATO. Turkey bears the burden of the alliance, but as soon as it shows strategic initiative, it is declared an “unsuitable ally.” The West wants to keep Turkey as a partial power because it is convenient. But history shows that states intended to be kept partial either collapse or find a new path. Turkey has already found this new path. Deepening military-strategic cooperation with Azerbaijan and Pakistan, security dialogues extending from the Middle East to South Asia, and coordination efforts with Saudi Arabia indicate that Ankara does not intend to be content solely with a Western-dependent security architecture. This is not a bloc directed against anyone, but a search for self-sufficient power. The outcome is clear. As Turkey strengthens, the West becomes frustrated, because a strong Turkey steps outside the order the West is accustomed to. But this frustration does not stop Turkey. On the contrary, it pushes it towards a more independent, more assertive, and more multifaceted policy. Whether Europe accepts this or not is no longer Ankara's problem.
Elbay Hasanli,
Zurich
