To understand where the policy of Persianization began in Iranian history, it is sufficient to look at documents, not ideological claims. Historical myths are based on emotion, while archives speak. What the archives say is unequivocal: there was no systematic policy of Persianization during the Qajar state period. This stemmed not from romantic tolerance, but from the state's real ethnic, political, and linguistic structure. The reign of Fath-Ali Shah Qajar, in particular, reveals this truth in all its nakedness.
Fath-Ali Shah was the ruler of the Qajar state from 1797–1834, and his era represents a stage in Iranian history where the Turkic political presence was still natural and dominant. The Qajar dynasty was of Turkic origin. The court language, the army language, the language of high administrative circles, and the language of daily communication were predominantly Turkic. This fact is neither a product of national romanticism nor modern political interests. This is a historical reality clearly visible in the official documents of the period.
Fath-Ali Shah Qajar is remembered in history for two main aspects. Firstly, the consolidation of the Qajar state and the formation of the image of a classical Eastern monarch. Secondly, the de facto dominant position of Turkic at the court and administrative levels. These two aspects complemented each other and defined the imperial character of the Qajar state.
In the historical context, the role of Fath-Ali Shah Qajar is characterized by several key points. He reigned from 1797–1834 and is considered the main figure who elevated the Qajar state to a true imperial scale. Relations with the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Britain acquired a systematic character precisely during his reign. Qajar court culture — paintings, ceremonies, the aesthetics of titles — reached its peak during his time. Despite heavy territorial losses in the wars against Russia (Treaties of Gulistan and Turkmenchay), it was possible to preserve the internal structure and political existence of the state. From this point, we can move on to the main issue.
An Ottoman archival document from 1811 is a key source in this regard. The document explicitly states that the Ottoman embassy in the Qajar state did not require translators. The reason is given simply and concretely: the vast majority of the population knew the Turkic language, and English diplomats operating in the region were accustomed to speaking both Persian and Turkic. This is not a modern interpretation or an ideological claim. This is the direct text of official diplomatic correspondence.
The aforementioned documents are collected in a publication titled “Osmanlı–İran İlişkileri: Arşiv Belgelerinde”. The book was published in Ankara by the Turkish Prime Ministry State Archives in 2010. The publication presents Ottoman archival documents along with original photocopies, transcriptions, and Turkic commentaries. The documents are provided in both Ottoman Turkic and Persian. These facts definitively prove one truth: if the Qajar state had pursued a systematic policy of Persianization, such widespread use, functionality, and acceptance of Turkic as a normal language of communication in diplomatic circles would not have been possible.
The Qajar state was a practical empire, not an ideological one. Language policy was based not on the goal of “nation-building,” but on the existing balance of power. Whoever was in a dominant position, their language was functional. It was that simple.
Fath-Ali Shah Qajar himself was a symbol of this reality. He was not an ideologue of Persian nationalism. During his reign, neither Turkic was forbidden, nor were non-Persian languages presented as a threat. On the contrary, multilingual reality was the natural state of the government. Qajar Iran, in this sense, was not a centralist national state but a classic multi-ethnic empire model. The breaking point begins precisely here.
In 1921, Reza Khan was brought to power through a military coup. He did not become shah; he was made shah. This coup was carried out with the overt political and military support of Britain. Qajar statehood was abolished, and for the first time in Iranian history, centralist, ethnically-based Persian nationalism became the state ideology. Reza Pahlavi derived his legitimacy neither from a historical dynasty nor from public consensus. For this reason, he had to invent a new source of legitimacy. This source became the ideology of a “unified Persian nation.” From this stage onwards, language ceased to be a means of communication and became a political tool. The Persian language was declared the foundation of the “unified nation,” while other languages were branded as a risk of fragmentation.
During the Pahlavi era, Turkic and other non-Persian languages were systematically suppressed. Education was conducted exclusively in Persian, other languages were marginalized in state institutions, and speaking Turkic was presented as a sign of backwardness and insubordination. This was not natural modernization. This was violent ideological engineering. Reza Pahlavi's goal was clear: to dismantle the multilingual, multi-centered political reality of the Qajar era and replace it with a monolithic, centrally controlled Persian identity. History was rewritten, the role of Turkic dynasties was overshadowed, and Iran's multi-ethnic past was systematically denied. Persianization was no longer presented as a cultural choice but as a matter of state security.
The 1979 Islamic Revolution also did not break this line. Only the form changed. The monarchy was replaced by a mullah theocracy, but the policy of Persianization was maintained as it was. The new regime legitimized the Persian language this time under the name of “Islamic centralism.” Turkic, Kurdish, Arabic, and other languages again remained marginalized. Education in the mother tongue was again not possible. The national problem was not solved; it was simply moved behind a religious curtain.
Thus, the line of Persianization that began with the Pahlavis did not change during the era of the mullahs either. The method is different, but the essence is the same. This policy, carried out yesterday in the name of nationalism, continues today in the name of religion. The state is again centrally governed, again one language and one identity are prioritized, and again non-Persian identities are presented as a threat. For this reason, the claim that “the Qajars were carrying out Persianization” is not merely a historical inaccuracy but historical manipulation. Archives refute this. Ottoman documents refute this. The records of European diplomats refute this.
The facts speak clearly: Persianization is not a product of the Qajar era, but of the Pahlavi coup, and it has been continued by the mullahs. History here is impartial. Whoever wishes can accept this, whoever does not, will live with myths. But the fact does not change. The era of Fath-Ali Shah Qajar was the last stage in Iran where Turkic identity, multilingualism, and imperial reality were still considered normal. The process that began after that was the systematic destruction of this reality. This is an unchanging line. And until this line is broken, Iran's internal problem will not be solved by relations with the West or by regional maneuvers. Because the problem is not abroad, but in a state philosophy built on historical denial.
Elbay Hasanli,
Zurich
