Yesterday, a ballistic missile advancing from Iran towards Turkey's airspace was detected. The Turkish Ministry of National Defense stated that the detected ballistic missiles were neutralized by NATO air and missile defense forces deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Regarding the incident, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan first contacted his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi. During the phone conversation, H. Fidan urged Iran to refrain from actions that could escalate the conflict.
Later, the President of Turkey commented on the issue, announcing that Iran had been warned to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents.
The President emphasized that the security of borders and airspace is never left to chance. As in the incident that occurred this morning, immediate intervention and necessary measures are being implemented in cooperation with NATO allies. Warnings have been conveyed clearly and decisively to prevent similar incidents from happening again. Erdoğan added that the will and capabilities to ensure the security of the country and its people are at their maximum level, and they have not wavered from this determination in the last 23 years.
In a statement to Modern.az regarding the developments, Turkish security expert Abdullah Ağar stated that for Iran, Turkey is not a frontline country like the Arabs:
"If Iran attacks the US presence in Turkey, this will draw Turkey into the conflict and, moreover, expand the conflict. Turkey is a NATO member, and it also has a direct land border and relations with Iran. At the same time, Turkey maintains and has developed relations with both Russia and China, and also possesses a multifaceted and developed relationship dynamic with the Arab world. With all these characteristics, Turkey is an actor with the highest potential to establish regional and global balance and mediation.
For these reasons, attacking Turkey for Iran carries the risk of automatically activating NATO and opening the Black Sea-Caucasus-Central Asia line. For all these reasons, such points are not attacked. Furthermore, these potential attacks cannot collapse the system; on the contrary, they will lead to its hardening."
The expert emphasized that Iran knows that if it strikes Turkey, it will push Ankara towards the US-Israel axis:
“Relations between Turkey and Iran are historically very different from relations between Iran and the Arab world. Since the Treaty of Qasr-i Shirin signed in 1639, the border has not changed, and there has been no direct war. However, there is competition, friction, and tension, but this does not disrupt the system. Iran knows that targeting Turkey will push Ankara towards the US-Israel axis. This would be Iran's strategic nightmare. The silent tension threshold between Turkey and Iran would be broken, and strategic influence tension would begin to increase.
At the same time, when Iran attacks Arab countries, it opens up a space to create pressure and manipulation through Shia communities. This has the ability to destabilize the internal stability of the Gulf monarchies. In Turkey, even if Iran has tactical potential through some media and other areas it influences, the spatial-mass and conceptual sectarian influences do not work as they do in the Arab world. Turkish society is more homogeneous, and the state's reflexes are tougher. In other words, Iran's sectarian-sociological calculations in Turkey will not work; on the contrary, they will create counter-resistance.
On the other hand, the population factor cannot be underestimated. Open military operations against Turkey would lead to internal nationalist reactions, deepen internal cracks in the regime, and at the same time turn Turkey into a natural player in post-regime scenarios. An external attack on Turkey would lead to rapid internal consolidation. In Arab monarchies, the reaction is more fragmented. Tehran knows this, and this difference is decisive in Iran's strategic calculations.”
A. Ağar stated that Turkey's geographical position is Iran's insurance:
“That is, Turkey is not only a "balancing point" for Iran, but also an energy supplier, a trade artery to the West, an energy and financial transit line, an area for indirect circumvention of sanctions, and a lifeline in a possible isolation scenario. If Iran experiences a crisis with Turkey, its energy exports, the Northern corridor, and alternative financial flows will decrease. This creates a significant economic and strategic risk. Let's highlight another important difference here. Iran's main target is not Turkey, but to define Turkey's position. Turkey's increasing ties with the US, its firm stance within NATO, its rapprochement with Israel, and its openly taking a position in an anti-Iran bloc would be a deadly threat for Iran. Therefore, Iran's strategy might be to prevent Turkey from moving to the front line without drawing Turkey into the conflict. This can be explained not by a passive strategy, but by an active balancing act requiring fine-tuning.”
Finally, Abdullah Ağar noted that one of the most important and profound reasons why Iran does not want to make Turkey a complete enemy is the very large component of the Turkic population within Iran:
It's not just about 30-35 million South Azerbaijani Turks. Here, we are talking about 2-3 million Qashqai Turks, 1.5-2 million Khorasan Turks, 2.5-3 million Turkmenistan Turks, 50-100 thousand Khalaj Turks, 300-400 thousand Shahsevan Turks, 200-300 thousand desert Turks. These are within the system. Turkey's ability to play a role in post-Iran scenarios is very high. No one, whether anti-Turkey or sympathetic to Turkey, would want to disrupt a potential Turkish initiative. Because if there were a split within the regime in Iran, Ankara could become a critical actor.”
