Following the 2-week ceasefire agreement reached between the United States (US) and Iran, the parties will attempt to finalize a peace agreement. This is the conclusion drawn from officials' statements.
The parties will meet in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, which mediated the ceasefire. Iran seeks the lifting of sanctions and the withdrawal of US forces from the region.
During the US-Iran talks to be held in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, on April 10, the American delegation will be led by Vice President J.D. Vance. According to ISNA, the Iranian delegation will be led by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran (Parliament).
Iranian media reports that "within the framework of Tehran's proposed 10-point plan, not only the nuclear program and regional security, but also the primary and secondary sanctions imposed on the country over the past 45 years will be discussed."
American journalist and political analyst Irina Tsukerman commented on the US-Iran ceasefire in a statement to Modern.az. She stated that the two-week ceasefire is a weak agreement that does not change the strategic balance and primarily creates an illusion of control:
“This is not a peace mechanism, but merely a pause aimed at temporarily reducing tension and easing political pressure. A short period does not form the mechanisms necessary for real peace and instead creates conditions for more uncertainty and tactical maneuvering.
The ceasefire particularly works in Iran's favor. This pause allows Tehran to restore its military and administrative structures, strengthen internal control, and reassess its positions. At the same time, Iran gains a political advantage by presenting it domestically as “resilience.”
Donald Trump's agreement to a short ceasefire after harsh rhetoric, however, weakens the effectiveness of US pressure tools. This reduces the credibility of future ultimatums and creates conditions for Iran to act more comfortably in negotiations.
It is expected that the next negotiations will focus more on technical and procedural issues – particularly sequence, the Strait of Hormuz, and the nuclear program. Sanctions and economic concessions will also be key topics. Iran will seek to achieve economic relief, while the US will face pressure to demonstrate concrete results. The US has already made some tactical concessions: it has agreed to the process by abandoning ultimatums, narrowed the scope of demands, and bought time for Iran. Iran's actions, however, are primarily tactical and do not weaken its strategic positions.
Overall, the probability of long-term peace is assessed as low. A more realistic scenario involves temporary agreements and recurring tensions. Consequently, this ceasefire does not resolve the conflict; it merely shifts it to a new phase and provides Iran with an opportunity to continue from a more advantageous position.”
According to I. Tsukerman, regional actors can profoundly shape the outcome:
“Because each regional actor influences the environment for the ceasefire to either evolve into a process or revert to conflict. Israel is the most crucial factor, as its security calculations are more urgent and less tolerant than Washington's political messages. If Jerusalem perceives the ceasefire as a mechanism that gives Iran time to regroup and keeps its core capabilities intact, Israeli pressure could narrow US diplomatic concessions and redirect the process towards coercion. Tehran understands this and exploits any visible gap between American political management and Israeli strategic impatience.
Turkey can influence the process by utilizing the diplomatic space opened by the pause. Ankara benefits from the reduction in regional instability and from appearing useful in a negotiation environment where direct trust is low. It can establish communication channels, shape regional discourse, and act as a stakeholder in the post-crisis environment. Broader regional participation is beneficial for Iran, as it weakens bilateral US pressure and transforms negotiations into a broader, multifaceted diplomatic arena.
Russia's role, though more indirect, is still significant, as Moscow benefits from US involvement in the process, regional instability, and any situation that prevents Washington from turning the crisis into a simple coercive success. Russia can encourage Tehran to remain firm on strategic principles while acting flexibly tactically. This could strengthen Iran's resistance to more intrusive long-term commitments. At the same time, it helps Iran feel less isolated during a prolonged negotiation period, boosts Tehran's self-confidence, and reduces the psychological impact of American pressure.
All of this still works in Iran's favor, as the more actors involved, the less likely Donald Trump is to impose a purely bilateral outcome based solely on pressure. A more complex regional environment creates cross-pressures, competing priorities, and more opportunities for diplomatic maneuvering for Tehran. Iran does not need all regional actors on its side; its main goal is to create enough complexity to prevent Washington from converting its temporary military superiority into a simple political solution.
Precisely for this reason, the ceasefire structured in its current form works in Iran's favor in almost all analyses. It buys time for the regime, expands its maneuvering capabilities, weakens the impact of Trump's threats, shifts competition to a procedural level, complicates coordination within the coalition, and creates conditions for Tehran to convert its survival into political capital. This arrangement does not resolve the conflict; rather, it provides Iran with a more advantageous position to continue it through other means.”
