Iran is currently experiencing one of the deepest structural crises of recent decades. Mass protests have moved beyond the stage of local social discontent and transformed into a crisis of political legitimacy. This process not only determines Iran's internal fate but is also becoming one of the key factors that will shape the future of Middle East geopolitics.
The main driver of the protests in Iran is macroeconomic collapse. The value of the national currency, the rial, has fallen to a historic low, inflation exceeds 50 percent, and food, medicine, and energy prices are out of control. The middle class has degraded, and poverty has become widespread.
The existing balance of legitimacy between the state and society has been disrupted. In the initial phase, protests began with economic demands. Slogans such as "wages," "subsidies," "unemployment," etc., were voiced. However, in a short period, this process transformed into anti-system political mobilization. Now, the main demand is regime change.
Naturally, external interference is also evident in the ongoing events. US leader Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that he stands with the protesters and would attack Iran if they were fired upon.
In a statement to Modern.az, Turkish security expert Abdullah Ağar stated that US sanctions, attempts at isolation, and the events following the Gaza war are making Iran very “fragile”:
"In addition, protest actions have now begun. Blood has also been shed in the actions. The US and Israel are also seen to be involved in the issues. Especially the US threatens to strike Iran if protesters are fired upon.
Now, this is a difficult situation for a country to extricate itself from. Looking back at history, it is possible to see that Iran has faced similar events. It has managed to control previous situations. Another issue is the confrontation between citizens and the state. Although this is a difficult situation for the state, it is possible to overcome it. There is no polarization or conflict between two powers; there is a clash between society and the state, meaning the armed forces. Although there are major problems, the winner of this clash is known beforehand. Iran will try to resolve the situation.
The ethnic, religious “fragility” and religious parameters in Iran have become much more defined recently. The situation has been made difficult for Iran to rectify. Naturally, there are signals of intervention from abroad, especially from Israel and the US. From this perspective, we may witness much more serious events in the coming days due to these developments.
If such a situation arises, Turkey and Azerbaijan must be the most prepared. The demographic presence of Kurds in Iran cannot be compared with that of Turks there. If PEJAK, PKK, and armed and politicized forces in northern Iraq attempt to threaten Turkish, South Azerbaijani regions in some form, a very major event could occur. Reactions to this must be prepared".
The expert emphasized that Azerbaijan and Turkey must act with a joint strategy:
"What happened between Hamas and Israel on October 7 is a turning point for the Middle East. Unfortunately, we will continue to observe its additional small and large tremors in the subsequent period.
In this regard, it is extremely important for Turkey and Azerbaijan to establish a common strategy within the framework of “One nation, two states.” It will be quite dangerous. It is a major event in terms of its scale. When the “cards” played through Pahlavi's son are also put on the table, some are inclined to influence Iran in a way that could lead to its fragmentation. This signifies a very important paradigm for the entire geography. These are events that necessitate geopolitical measures".
Another Turkish security expert, İmbat Muğlu, noted that the processes occurring in Iran in recent years are not sudden and accidental crises, but rather periodic eruptions of structural problems that have accumulated over a long period:
"The main reasons for this process are as follows:
- Economic pressures – international sanctions, high inflation, and unemployment;
- Crisis of political representation and legitimacy;
- The deep chasm between the social expectations of the younger generation and the regime's ideological model;
- Tensions created by ethnic and sectarian diversity with centralized state governance;
- The impact of the Syrian war on the region, as well as the acceleration of this process by the actions of the US and Israel against Iran.
The probability of the current events resulting in regime change in the short term is quite low. This is because the Iranian state possesses a strong security mechanism, ideological pillars formed over years, experience in managing crises, and the ability to direct broad segments of society in a certain direction. Nevertheless, this situation does not indicate that the regime is strengthening. In other words, a revolution is not expected in Iran, but chronic instability will continue to deepen".
Regarding the threat of foreign intervention in Iran, the expert stated:
"Direct military intervention – like the 2003 Iraq scenario – is unlikely at the current stage. The main reasons for this are Iran's vast geography, large demographic and military potential, as well as existing networks of influence in the region (Hezbollah, Shia militias, Houthis, etc.). However, indirect intervention is real and continuous. Economic sanctions, cyberattacks, information warfare, and pressures through media are having a significant impact on Iran. From this perspective, the Iranian leadership's emphasis on “foreign forces” is not entirely unfounded, but it is undeniable that it is exaggerated with the aim of overshadowing internal problems.
On the other hand, a full-scale disintegration scenario remains a weak possibility in the short and medium term. Nevertheless, certain risks cannot be overlooked. Long-term economic decline, erosion of the central government's legitimacy, and increasing demands for autonomy in ethnic regions – among Kurds, Balochs, Arabs, and South Azerbaijani Turks – are potential sources of danger. Iran is not a state that will collapse “overnight” like Yugoslavia. However, as in the example of post-Soviet Russia, a process of increasing tension between the center and the peripheries, and the internal erosion of the state, could occur. Even if the state does not completely collapse, its capacity for control and governance may weaken".
İmbat Muğlu also discussed Turkey's approach to the issues:
"Turkey's relationship with Iran is not ideological but geopolitical. For Ankara, a sudden collapse of Iran would mean border security issues, migration waves, terrorism risks, and sectarian conflicts. A weakened Iran, on the other hand, would create the risk of US and Israeli influence advancing directly to Turkey's borders. For this reason, Turkey, in principle, supports Iran's territorial integrity and the protection of its state institutions. At the same time, it maintains a balanced stance against Iran's regional expansionist policies. In the event of a possible external threat, Turkey would not form a military alliance with Iran, but it would also not openly support its fragmentation or occupation. Ankara's main line is this: the stronger Iran is, the more stable it is - but not to a level that would pose a threat to Turkey.
Currently, the number of Azerbaijani Turks living in Iran is greater than the population of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which is a highly strategically important indicator. However, this demographic advantage does not automatically lead to political outcomes. Activity in economic and trade centers, cultural continuity, historical integration into Iranian state structures, as well as the cautious approach of regional powers – Russia, Turkey, and the West – indicate that this process will be long-term and low-profile. This is not a sudden rupture but a phase of gradual erosion. What is observed in Iran today is more a shaking of the system than a revolution. Foreign intervention, meanwhile, continues not directly, but indirectly and in a controlled manner".
