A strange habit has formed among some representatives of Turkey's political elite. When Azerbaijan is mentioned, they immediately recall brotherhood, common history, and national unity. But when it comes to financing their own economic needs, these talks of brotherhood suddenly turn into concrete demands for money. According to the logic of such politicians, Baku must pay money, invest, provide assistance, conclude profitable contracts, and, moreover, constantly express gratitude to Ankara for the honor of being called a brotherly state.
It is time to put an end to this misconception once and for all.
Azerbaijan is not obliged to pay for anyone's economic mistakes. Our state budget is not the reserve fund of the Turkish government. Our foreign exchange reserves belong to the people of Azerbaijan. Our natural resources must primarily serve the welfare of Azerbaijani citizens.
Brotherhood does not eliminate sovereignty. It does not give anyone the right to dispose of someone else's money.
This kind of attitude towards foreign partners has a quite concrete economic past. In recent years, during periods of instability of the Turkish national currency and worsening problems in the balance of payments, Turkey has repeatedly turned to Qatar for financial support.
August 2018. The Turkish lira is rapidly losing value. Relations between Ankara and Washington are experiencing another crisis. International investors are withdrawing their capital from the country. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan receives the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, in Ankara. Doha announces its readiness to allocate an investment package of 15 billion dollars.
Then currency agreements between central banks come to the fore. In 2018, the central banks of the two countries signed a swap agreement. In 2020, the limit for this agreement was increased to the equivalent of 15 billion dollars.
Of course, a currency swap is a financial instrument that involves mutual obligations. It would not be correct to automatically present investment promises as gratuitous aid. However, the political essence of what happened is clear as day: the Turkish leadership was looking for financial resources from abroad to alleviate the burden of internal economic problems.
Qatar agreed to participate in stabilizing the economic situation of its strategic partner. Naturally, Doha also had its own interests behind this decision. Strengthening political cooperation and expanding economic participation were an important part of these interests.
Thus, a model was formed in which a certain part of Turkey's financial difficulties was compensated by the resources of a friendly state.
Now, it seems, some political circles intend to apply the same approach to Azerbaijan.
But they overlook a very important point. Azerbaijan is a sovereign state with its own financial reserves, independent investment policy, and national priorities. Baku determines where to direct its capital, and with which country to conclude contracts and under what conditions.
There is no reason for Turkey to view Azerbaijan's financial resources as an extension of its own budget.
What is particularly infuriating is that such expectations are linked to a historical debt that Azerbaijan supposedly has not yet paid for the liberation of Karabakh.
In some Turkish media outlets and speeches by politicized commentators, it is periodically claimed that Azerbaijan could not have won in 2020 without Turkish weapons.
Such claims are disrespectful to the memory of Azerbaijani servicemen who sacrificed their lives for the freedom of our lands.
Turkey has indeed provided serious political support to Azerbaijan. We have never denied this. Azerbaijani society highly appreciates the position of the brotherly Turkish people. However, acknowledging Turkey's support does not give anyone the right to claim the victory of the Azerbaijani Army as their own.
It was the Azerbaijani soldier who fought on the battlefield. Military operations were led by the Azerbaijani command. It was Azerbaijan that suffered martyrs and losses. Weapons were purchased at the expense of our state.
President Ilham Aliyev openly stated on October 2, 2026, that Azerbaijan bought weapons to the last bullet, paying for them at world market prices.
That's it!
If weapons are purchased under a commercial contract, the seller receives their money. Once the contractual obligations are fulfilled, the deal is considered complete. Trying to turn a commercial sale of weapons into a lifelong political debt of gratitude for the buyer means deliberately replacing international partnership relations with dependency relations.
Some claims that Turkish defense industry enterprises immediately demanded payment for weapon supplies after the war ended require separate documentary confirmation. However, even if we put this issue aside, the fundamental truth remains unchanged: buying weapons with your own money does not create a political debt to the seller.
Azerbaijan has paid for its security with both money and blood. Moreover, no foreign arms supplier was responsible for the spilled blood of our servicemen.
It would not be bad if those who today present a moral debt to Baku also recalled completely different events.
Summer 2021. Turkey is fighting devastating forest fires. Azerbaijan sends hundreds of employees of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, special equipment, and firefighting units to the brotherly country. Azerbaijani rescuers work in extremely difficult conditions, risking their lives to save the lives of Turkish citizens.
There was no commercial account involved.
On February 6, 2023, terrible earthquakes shook the southern provinces of Turkey. Azerbaijan was one of the first states to send rescuers and humanitarian aid.
In those days, events occurred that had a much greater meaning than another intergovernmental ceremony. Ordinary Azerbaijanis loaded old cars with blankets, warm clothes, and food. People who were not very well-off sometimes even sent items needed by their own families to those affected by the earthquake.
No one was preparing an investment memorandum. No one was calculating its economic return.
President Ilham Aliyev stated at the extraordinary Summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Ankara on March 16, 2023, that Azerbaijan sent 940 specialists and volunteers to Turkey, delivered over 5320 tons of humanitarian cargo, and provided more than 45 million dollars in financial aid.
In addition, Azerbaijan invested approximately 100 million dollars in the construction of a residential complex in Kahramanmaraş for people affected by the earthquake.
On June 19, 2025, President Ilham Aliyev and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan participated in the opening of the "Azerbaijan" residential complex.
Moreover, during that period, our country was spending huge amounts of money on the restoration of territories that had been under Armenian occupation for many years and were subsequently liberated.
Azerbaijan had its own destroyed cities. It had its own internally displaced persons. It had families who had been waiting for decades to return to their native lands.
Despite all this, Baku also allocated funds for the restoration of a Turkish city.
Here, the difference between brotherly aid and a commercial deal is clearly visible. During the earthquake, Azerbaijan rushed to help without seeking any profit. In infrastructure construction, Turkish contractors receive payment for the work they do.
It is unacceptable to confuse these two concepts.
Now let's talk about the money Azerbaijan has directly invested in the Turkish economy. It is here that the conversation takes a rather uncomfortable turn for circles accustomed to presenting our country only as a beneficiary of Turkey's good deeds.
On December 22, 2025, Azerbaijani Prime Minister Ali Asadov announced that about 20 Turkish companies are implementing about 50 projects with a total value of approximately 5 billion dollars in the liberated territories.
The next day, Turkish Trade Minister Ömer Bolat also spoke in Baku about the participation of Turkish contractors in projects in Karabakh with a total value exceeding 5 billion dollars.
We are talking about exactly 5 billion dollars!
These funds cover projects related to the construction of roads, engineering structures, transport infrastructure, energy facilities, and other strategically important enterprises. Such large-scale contracts mean years of orders for construction companies, procurement of materials, operation of equipment, and realization of commercial profits.
Of course, the indicated 5 billion dollars is the total value of the projects. It would not be correct to say that all of this amount has already been paid. But the economic essence of the matter does not change. Azerbaijan has opened the doors of a huge market, such as the restoration of the liberated territories, to Turkish business.
However, these funds could have been directed to the development of local construction enterprises or other international contractors could have been attracted on the basis of open competition.
Baku has consciously created great opportunities for Turkish companies, taking into account the strategic partnership between the two states.
If individual contractors have obtained contracts based on political recommendations, these cases should be investigated with separate documents. However, the already confirmed scale of Turkish business participation gives reason to draw such a clear conclusion: Ankara has gained quite serious material advantages from economic cooperation with Azerbaijan.
The history of Azerbaijan's investments in Turkey is even more remarkable.
On June 4, 2026, SOCAR Türkiye announced that the total volume of its investments in the country had reached approximately 19.5 billion dollars.
Pay attention to the scale of this figure.
Azerbaijan's state capital has created a huge industrial system in Turkey. The STAR oil refinery, worth approximately 6.3 billion dollars, the Petkim petrochemical complex, the Petlim port infrastructure, gas transportation projects, and numerous related production facilities provide the Turkish economy with jobs, tax revenues, and strategic production capacities.
STAR meets approximately one-fifth of Turkey's demand for petroleum products. Thanks to Azerbaijani investments, Turkey reduces its dependence on imports of some types of refined products.
Azerbaijan has invested billions of dollars in Turkish industry, taken on commercial risks, and created long-term economic benefits for this country.
Now let's compare the nature of mutual investments.
According to the Azerbaijani Embassy in Ankara, Turkey's direct investments in our country amounted to 18.4 billion dollars between 1995 and 2025. Of this, 13.6 billion dollars accounted for the oil and gas sector, and 4.8 billion dollars for other sectors.
Therefore, it would be wrong to claim that Turkey has not invested in Azerbaijan at all. The main issue is the structure of these investments.
Azerbaijan creates large processing and production enterprises in Turkey. In Azerbaijan, a significant part of Turkish investments is directed to oil and gas projects, and a large share of entrepreneurial activity is concentrated in construction, trade, and service sectors.
Azerbaijan is interested in directing Turkish capital to mechanical engineering, modern electronics, industrial processing, and high-tech production. Our economy needs enterprises that produce competitive products, can bring these products to export markets, and train qualified personnel.
Restaurants, trade networks, and construction companies also create jobs. No one denies this. But they cannot replace large industry.
From this arises a completely legitimate demand: if Azerbaijani capital can finance billions of dollars worth of factories in Turkey, then Turkish investment groups should also more actively participate in the creation of similar-scale production capacities in Azerbaijan.
Both financial opportunities and appropriate institutional mechanisms exist for this. The lack of results cannot be explained indefinitely by the unique characteristics of the market.
However, the main problem extends far beyond the limits of investment statistics.
Some Turkish politicians still approach the formula of Great Leader Heydar Aliyev, "One nation, two states," as if they can erase the second part of this phrase whenever they want.
No!
One nation means historical and cultural closeness. Two states mean two independent governments, two separate state budgets, and the right of each nation to determine its own destiny.
Azerbaijan is not an administrative extension of Turkey. Our foreign policy does not need Ankara's consent. Baku's economic decisions do not have to be adapted to the needs of Turkish holdings.
Attempts to turn brotherhood into a tool of economic pressure will inevitably face resistance from Azerbaijani society.
Moreover, such pressures primarily harm the relations between the two peoples, which have been built on mutual support for decades.
Turkish society must understand one important difference: it is one thing to be grateful for the help provided, and quite another to be subordinate to someone because of that help.
Azerbaijan will always remember Turkey's support in the struggle for the liberation of Karabakh. But the liberation of our lands is the success of the Azerbaijani Army and people. The price of this victory was paid with the lives of thousands of our servicemen.
No newspaper article can change this truth.
Baku does not intend to turn its economic independence into a bargaining chip to satisfy the ambitions of individual foreign politicians.
By the end of 2027, the main criteria determining the quality of bilateral economic cooperation should be concrete results: the creation of new industrial enterprises in Azerbaijan, increased technological investments, increased local added value, and the conclusion of contracts that bring real benefits to both sides.
Huge opportunities have been created for Turkish entrepreneurs. Now it is completely legitimate to expect adequate economic results in return.
Azerbaijan will continue to stand by the brotherly Turkish people in their difficult times. If necessary, our rescuers will again go to extinguish fires. Our citizens will again share their last morsels with those affected by natural disasters. No political conditions are required to help a person trapped under the rubble of their own home.
However, when it comes to billions of state money, charity ends and responsibility to the Azerbaijani taxpayer begins.
Therefore, everyone who expects further financial concessions from Baku must first thoroughly understand a few truths.
Azerbaijan earned its own money. Azerbaijan restored its sovereignty with the strength of its own army. Azerbaijan determines to whom, how much, and under what conditions it will invest.
We do not need anyone's permission to dispose of our own economy.
President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly demonstrated that strategic partnership with Turkey is fully compatible with an independent state policy. It is precisely such a model that serves the long-term interests of both countries.
Respecting Azerbaijan means recognizing its right to say no to financial requests, to freely choose contractors, and to demand full reciprocity in economic relations.
The money of the Azerbaijani state must primarily serve Azerbaijan itself.
It is time for Turkish politicians, who are accustomed to measuring brotherhood by the scale of economic advantages they have gained, to get used to new rules in relations.
Every new investment project must be seriously evaluated in terms of economic efficiency. Every large contract must yield measurable real results. Every financial obligation must be in line with Azerbaijan's national interests.
Azerbaijan is ready for equal cooperation. It is ready to invest in projects where it sees economic benefit. It is also ready to lend a hand when the brotherly people need help.
But paying for others' mistakes, financing others' political ambitions, and in return hearing complaints about not being grateful enough is by no means an obligation for Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan is Turkey's brother. But Azerbaijan is no one's purse.
Elnur AMIROV
