The latest processes around religious communities in Turkey once again bring a question to the agenda. When do closed networks formed in the name of religion cease to be religious associations and turn into political, economic, and organizational power?
The issue has reached a point where it cannot be considered solely Turkey's internal political agenda. This is because, against the background of Azerbaijan-Turkey brotherhood, the breadth of relations between societies, and the mutual movement of people, the potential impact of certain religious-social networks formed in Turkey on the Azerbaijani environment also requires special attention.
In this regard, the FETÖ experience is no longer a topic for history books for Azerbaijan. This experience showed that a foreign religious-social network can initially be accepted with the appearance of education, culture, and social activity, and years later, it can turn into a security issue for the state.
Now, the large-scale investigation conducted in Turkey regarding the religious community known as “Süleymancılar” also raises the question of whether the same experience will be repeated in another form.
Since August 2026, large-scale operations have been carried out in Turkey against the religious community known as “Süleymancılar”. Information has been disseminated that operations were conducted in 17 provinces within the framework of the Ankara Prosecutor's investigation, dozens of people were detained, and numerous addresses were searched.
At the center of the investigation is Alihan Kuriş, presented as the leader of the community, and the financial-economic structure associated with him. MASAK investigations also note large-volume financial transactions between companies. At the same time, Turkish officials stated that the issue is not directed at religious belief, but at financial and organizational activities. This detail is especially important. Because here, it is not about religious beliefs. The issue is whether a separate network of finance, education, dormitories, business, and political connections is formed behind a religious identity. It is at this point that Turkey's FETÖ experience comes to mind.
The FETÖ problem did not arise in one day. On the contrary, it was about a network that expanded over many years through educational institutions, student dormitories, various public structures, and social connections. In materials published years ago in the press, extensive information was published about the activities of high schools and Caucasus University associated with the “Gulen community” in Azerbaijan. In the next stage, the approach changed in Turkey itself. FETÖ was evaluated by Ankara not just as a religious-social movement, but as a matter of state security. In Azerbaijan, the activities of structures reported to be linked to this network were also terminated.
The position of Azerbaijani religious institutions regarding FETÖ activities and the issue of Caucasus University was announced at that time. In that statement, FETÖ was characterized as an organization pursuing political, not religious, goals. Therefore, the main lesson for Azerbaijan is that a network bearing a religious name does not automatically mean it is safe. The main danger is that a religious or social association begins to build a separate state-like structure within the state. It has its own finances, personnel, education system, information channels, and foreign relations.
It has its own human resources within society. This model, after a while, turns into an organizational network rather than a religious community. This is precisely why presenting the recent operations related to “Süleymancılar” in Turkey only as “a struggle against a religious group” may not fully explain the essence of the matter. It is emphasized that the investigation by Turkish law enforcement agencies is directed not at religious activity, but at the financial-economic structure.
There is another important point in Turkey's political experience. Relations between religious communities and political authorities do not always remain stable. A structure that becomes a social pillar for the state in one period can turn into a political rival in another period. A network that once cooperated with the state can later turn into a power beyond the state's control. This is one of the biggest lessons of the FETÖ experience. This is precisely why the main issue for the state is not which community is loyal to the government. The main issue is that no non-state network should have parallel influence over the state's strategic institutions. Because state policy should be built on laws and institutions, not on the loyalty of individuals and groups.
After all this, a question arises: where does the danger for Azerbaijan begin? Because Azerbaijan-Turkey relations are special relations. There are linguistic, historical, cultural, family, and social ties between the two countries. Processes taking place in Turkey are also closely monitored in Azerbaijani society. That is why the question of whether any closed religious-social network operating in Turkey has connections with Azerbaijan cannot be ignored from a security perspective. This is, in fact, drawing conclusions from the problems Turkey has experienced with state security. Azerbaijan's path in the FETÖ issue has already shown this.
There is another side to the issue. In September 2026, information was disseminated about the prosecution of a person presented as the “head of the Baku branch of the Süleyman community” and a number of other individuals as a result of measures carried out by special services in Azerbaijan. This fact removes the topic from being solely an internal problem of Turkey. If there is information about the illegal activities of any religious-social network in Azerbaijan, it is natural for the state to react legally.
In 2010, information was disseminated about the detention of Turkish citizens suspected of engaging in illegal religious propaganda in Azerbaijan. It was noted that an investigation was being conducted in Ganja regarding the propaganda of the “Süleymancılar” religious sect. This fact shows that the issue is not entirely new for Azerbaijan. But today, the conditions are different. There are social networks, transnational financial opportunities. It is easier for a religious-social network created in one country to operate in another country compared to previous periods.
The point is that there must be a boundary between religious freedom and security. A very sensitive boundary needs to be protected here. Freedom of religious belief and a closed organizational network are not the same thing. People believing in their religion is one thing. The establishment of a political and economic network in the name of religion is a completely different matter. Therefore, the target of the struggle should be illegal organization, not religion. Otherwise, the state may confuse the security issue with religious freedoms. This would create other problems for society. The healthiest approach is to apply the law equally to everyone.
Turkey's FETÖ experience showed that danger cannot only be sought in weapons. This danger arises in schools, sometimes in business structures, charitable organizations, and networks of social relations that seem very simple and harmless to people. This is precisely why the state's security system must work not only after an incident occurs, but also when the network is forming.
The conclusion Azerbaijan should draw from what is happening in Turkey today is not to distance itself from Turkey. On the contrary, it is a brotherhood approach, an instinct to protect a brother. The most dangerous scenario for Azerbaijan is not the existence of some religious community. The dangerous scenario is that this community creates a parallel system of finance, personnel, education, information, and political connections outside state control. The FETÖ incident showed that this is possible.
The current investigations in Turkey around “Süleymancılar” raise the question of whether the state will be able to recognize a danger it once experienced a second time under a different name. The approach in Azerbaijan is that religious belief is a human right, but no closed network has the right to turn into a separate state within the state. Because the biggest issue for state security is to recognize everything by its name. States make fewer mistakes when they fight models, not names.
If you wish, in the next stage, I can also put the text into its final edited form to be placed on a newspaper page, only touching on spelling and technical errors.
Elnur AMIROV
