The war in Ukraine has clearly revealed the true structure of the Russian army and its approach to human resources. The recruitment of foreign citizens, migrants, and individuals in a legally vulnerable position into the Russian army is no longer carried out through an ideological mechanism, but rather through a social and criminal one. This mechanism is neither a classic mercenary army model nor a form of regular military service. It is an exploitative system with no exit, established under the guise of a contract.
One of the clearest sources demonstrating how this system operates is the interviews with prisoners published in “Kyiv Post”. The story of Azerbaijani citizen Azar Arzuman Ahmadov clearly illustrates the key elements of this mechanism.
Ahmadov does not present his contract with the Russian army as a voluntary choice. According to him, due to his criminal past, his family was subjected to pressure, money was regularly demanded from them, and when he appealed to the police, he was effectively directed to the army as a “safe way out”. At this stage, state bodies become part of the same mechanism as the military establishment.
The first reality a foreign citizen contracting with the Russian army encounters is the lack of provisions and systematic extortion. (robbing people through blackmail)
“They didn’t give us anything. We had to buy food with our own money.” (They gave us nothing. We had to buy food with our own money.)
Even the most basic military equipment is sold for money. “200,000 rubles for a bulletproof vest, 20,000 rubles for a radio.” (200,000 rubles for a bulletproof vest, 20,000 rubles for a communication device.)
This demonstrates the core principle of the mercenary system: the risk belongs to the state, but the soldier bears the cost. The contract does not provide legal protection; on the contrary, it creates complete dependence. There is no mechanism to exit the contract. In practice, this contract ends in only two ways: death or captivity.
The cruelest aspect of the mechanism emerges on the battlefield. What Ahmadov describes is not a random episode, but a structural behavior.
“I saw so many young men, around 18–19 years old, all dead, already rotting. No one takes them.” (I saw many young men, around 18–19 years old, in the forest. All were dead, already rotting. No one was taking them.)
This statement clearly demonstrates the worthlessness of human life in the Russian army. The failure to retrieve the bodies of the deceased is not merely a logistical problem. It is a mechanism of irresponsibility and evasion of accountability. The fewer official casualties recorded, the less political responsibility arises.
Ahmadov's abandonment by his commander with the words “we'll pick them up later” reveals another characteristic of this system: the foreign and contract soldier is a replaceable resource. Their fate holds no significance for the structure.
“They treated us badly, worse than pigs.” (They treated us worse than pigs.)
This sentence is not an emotional complaint, but an acknowledgment of a status difference. In a regular army, such a hierarchy exists: permanent personnel, conscripts, and contracted foreigners. The latter category is virtually devoid of rights.
This mechanism does not apply only to Azerbaijani citizens. The same model is applied to individuals recruited from Bosnia, Central Asia, Africa, and Russia's own regions. The common denominator is one: social vulnerability, legal isolation, and lack of alternatives.
The ideological cover of the mercenary mechanism is also false. Neither the concept of “Russian world” nor “defense of the homeland” plays a real role here. Ahmadov openly admits this.
“This war is wrong, a mistake. Boys, don’t come; everyone here is deceived.” (This war is wrong, a mistake. Boys, don't come; everyone here has been deceived.)
This admission summarizes the essence of the mechanism: recruitment through deception, retention through coercion, destruction through indifference.
From a legal perspective, these individuals find themselves in an even more severe situation. According to Azerbaijani legislation, participation in foreign armed conflicts is a serious crime, and mercenary activities are punishable by long-term imprisonment, in some cases life imprisonment. This means that a person joining the Russian army falls into a legal vacuum: a replaceable resource for Russia, but a criminal for Azerbaijan.
Thus, the mercenary mechanism in the Russian army is not a classic military model. It is a method of managing war with human material. Here, human life has no value; there is only a calculation of sustainability. What is important for the system is the continuation of the battle, not the fate of the combatant.
The most dangerous aspect of this mechanism is that it extends the war beyond the front line and spreads it into the social environment. Poverty, fear, and lack of rights are turned into weapons. And this weapon strikes the most vulnerable.
Elbəyi Həsənli,
Zurich
