In the Middle East, the balance of power is shifting, alliances are breaking down, and new ones are being formed. But one thing remains unchanged: sectarian politics is still the main weapon of geopolitics. Although Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia use this weapon differently, they are all caught in the same historical knot. This knot was attempted to be untied three hundred years ago by a Turkic ruler – Nader Shah Afshar.
Nader Shah saw the problem more clearly than anyone else: the root of the Iran–Ottoman conflict was not religion. At its core was the transformation of sectarianism into state ideology. Therefore, he wanted to end the war not with a sword, but with a structural solution. The letter Nader Shah addressed to the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud I clearly shows that this approach was not accidental. In that letter, written in the mid-1730s, Nader Shah sent a clear message to the Ottomans: the root of the Iran–Ottoman conflict was not religion, but the transformation of sectarianism into politics. Nader Shah proposed the recognition of the Ja'fari school as the fifth legal school of Sunni Islam and wrote that if this step were taken, “Muslim blood would no longer be shed in the name of sectarianism.” This was not merely a religious appeal. It was a geopolitical project designed to remove the geography of Iran from being a perpetual war zone. The Ottomans did not accept this proposal. Because this recognition meant not only a religious compromise but also the sharing of political influence in the Islamic world. Thus, Nader Shah's project remained on paper, and sectarianism continued to be one of the main weapons of the Middle East.
Iran: Turning Sectarianism into Power
Today's Iran is precisely the continuation of this unfinished line. The theocratic system uses sectarianism not just as a belief, but as a tool for regional expansion. Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen — the same mechanism works everywhere: legitimacy through sectarianism, influence through legitimacy. This model is the scenario Nader Shah feared: when sectarianism turns into politics, the state does not strengthen; it hardens internally and creates enemies externally.
Saudi Arabia: Sectarianism as a Mechanism of Fear
Saudi Arabia also uses sectarianism as a pillar of the state, but in a different form. Here, sectarianism is not for expansion, but for the preservation of the status quo. The fear of Iran lies at the center of Saudi policy. This fear, on one hand, creates confrontation with Tehran, and on the other hand, strengthens alliances with Washington and regional partners. The recent softening of relations with Iran is not a fundamental shift, but a tactical pause.
Sectarianism is still in play.
Turkey: The Model Closest to Nader Shah's Line
In this trio, Turkey stands in a different position. During the Ottoman period, there was a Sunni identity, but sectarianism never became a total ideology. In the Republican era, the state explicitly placed sectarianism within an institutional framework. For this reason, Turkey: – can talk with Iran, – can cooperate with Saudi Arabia, – does not turn sectarianism into the main tool of regional expansion. This is directly closer to the line Nader Shah desired — the idea of neutralizing sectarianism.
Conclusion
Nader Shah lost. But history shows that he was right. Iran turned sectarianism into a weapon and dragged the region into tension. Saudi Arabia tried to protect itself with sectarianism. Turkey, despite all its contradictions, did not turn sectarianism into the sole pillar of the state.
Three hundred years later, the Middle East is still grappling with the question Nader Shah posed: Should the state manage sectarianism, or should sectarianism manage the state? As long as this question remains unanswered, the region will find neither peace nor stability.
Elbay Hasanli,
Switzerland, Zurich
