The map is being redrawn
The political, economic, and even geographical architecture of the world is in a phase of fundamental transformation. States that were considered strategic allies yesterday are standing on opposite sides of the confrontation line today, and traditional geopolitical blocs are losing their borders. This process is not an abstract thesis; the Russia-Ukraine war is its bloodiest manifestation. Now, analysts' attention is increasingly focused on one point: is Armenia becoming the new Ukraine of the South Caucasus?
Historical roots, traces of the Russia-Ukraine confrontation dating back to the princely period
The roots of the Russia-Ukraine conflict go much deeper than modern history. Both nations trace their national identity to the same medieval state, Kievan Rus (Kievan Rus), which existed in the IX-XIII centuries. This is the initial ideological source of the conflict. Moscow presents the Kievan Rus state as the cradle of Russian statehood, while Kyiv considers the same historical heritage as the foundation of Ukrainian national identity.
As a result, the question of "who is whose heir" between the two modern states has moved away from academic debate and become a direct issue of political legitimacy. This historical rivalry has been repeated in various forms for centuries. From the Lithuanian-Polish period to the Russian Empire, from the Soviet Union to the modern era, Ukraine has always remained at the center of the question "whose sphere of influence will it be in?"
But why is this issue repeating itself now? It seems that at the core of the current conflict is not a simple territorial dispute, but an issue of identity and sphere of influence. This type of conflict is resolved by identity consensus, far from military victory; military victory creates a temporary pause. That is why this confrontation, which seemed to have been "resolved" several times in the 20th century, erupted again.
Armenia, a repeat of the same scenario?
Seeing this historical model in the context of today's Armenia does not seem unfounded. Armenia has also historically been one of the central elements of Russia's "sphere of influence" (near abroad) doctrine. Now Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a state where a Russian military base (Gyumri) is located, and an integral part of the Eurasian Economic Union.
However, in recent years this formula has begun to falter. The joint declaration signed between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the USA in Washington on August 8, 2025, Armenia's official agreement to cooperate with Washington and third parties within the framework of the TRIPP project, as well as Yerevan's steps towards integration with the European Union, all these cause a "Second Ukraine scenario" reaction in Moscow.
Moscow's warning, "Ukraine analogy" in official rhetoric
This similarity is not a hypothesis of external analysts, but a term used by Russian officials. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has repeatedly stated that Western circles are trying to draw Armenia into the same political orbit, just as they have brought Ukraine and Moldova under their influence. He emphasized that this would lead to "catastrophic" consequences. In addition, Moscow declared that Armenia's desire for integration into the European Union would "soon disappear", openly reminding Yerevan that it faces an "either-or" choice between the Eurasian Economic Union and the EU. This rhetorical pressure is also accompanied by practical steps. Russia has restricted the import of agricultural products (mineral water, fruits and vegetables, alcoholic beverages) from Armenia. The same scenario, this is precisely a repeat of the "economic coercion" model previously applied by Russia against Ukraine and Moldova.
President Putin's statement at the press conference after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek that Russia is "ready" to withdraw its military base in Gyumri, and the phrase "Is Armenia ready for this? We will not impose anything by force" is actually a continuation of the pressure strategy. Officially handing the ball of choice to Yerevan in diplomacy also creates a serious warning association.
Brussels' counter-strategy, "warm embrace" tactic
At the same time, the European Union is actively moving in the opposite direction. It can be unequivocally considered that this is a complete repeat of the model applied after the events in Ukraine. In response to Russia's trade restrictions, the EU announced an emergency financial aid package of more than 50 million euros to Armenia, with the first installment of 34 million euros already allocated. In parallel, Brussels is discussing the application of the Autonomous Trade Measures regime to Armenia. This is a mechanism that provides for duty-free market access, and precisely the same regime was applied to Ukraine after the Russian invasion in 2022, and earlier to Moldova.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's own words deliberately emphasize this parallel: stating that they "know very well" Moscow's tactic of turning economic ties into a tool of political pressure, she stressed that this is "unacceptable" and declared that Europe stands "firmly" by Armenia. In diplomatic language, this step is an official confirmation of the comparison with Ukraine.
Ukraine analogy
This comparison is not merely the interpretation of external observers. It was explicitly voiced by Putin himself. Armenia's leading independent media outlet CivilNet wrote in May 2026 that Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a briefing after Russia's Victory Day parade, openly stated that Armenia's aspiration to join the EU could lead to similar consequences as in Ukraine: "We saw the same thing in Ukraine. It all started with Ukraine's attempt to join the EU. This was just the first stage... All this led to a coup d'état, to the events in Crimea and southeastern Ukraine, to military operations," Putin warned.
A month later, in June, Russian media highlighted an even sharper episode. After the Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana, Putin directly warned that if Armenia adopted EU standards, Moscow would "stop" all economic integration with Yerevan, and Armenian citizens would require permits to work in Russia. The Russian Foreign Ministry subsequently recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations. Such an approach is a rare and harsh diplomatic reaction in Russian life.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, after Ukrainian President Zelensky's participation in the European Political Community Summit in Yerevan on May 4, stated that this "showed the future that the EU is preparing for Armenian citizens." All this is additional proof of how deliberately and systematically the Ukraine comparison is used by Russia.
Western analytical centers confirm structural similarity
Western expert circles also frequently refer to the same parallel, albeit in a different emotional framework. The Washington-based CEPA (Center for European Policy Analysis) analytical center writes in its analysis titled "Russia to Armenia: Do as We Say" that although Russia declares itself "completely calm" about Armenia's efforts to approach the EU, there is a threatening subtext behind it. It notes that Putin himself emphasized that it is impossible for Armenia to "sit" on both blocs simultaneously.
The European security analytical center SpecialEurasia, in its report "Armenia's Foreign Policy Dilemma," warns that Moscow still has serious tools of pressure. These include energy prices, labor migration flows, trade access, and Russian military facilities. If Yerevan officially joins the EU or changes the status of Russian military bases, this would create a serious risk of escalation.
The American-based Jamestown Foundation, on the other hand, focuses on Russia's preoccupation with the war in Ukraine: "Russia's war against Ukraine and the extensive sanctions imposed by the West have played a role in Russia's flexibility towards Turkey, as well as in its reduced attention to the South Caucasus." That is, Armenia's leaning towards the West is happening precisely in a window where Russia is "busy" in Ukraine, and there is a high probability that Moscow will return to the region and exert harsher pressure after the war ends.
In a sharper form, citing Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service, Defense Express writes that Russia is no longer mentioned as a strategic partner in the strategic action plan for 2026-2031 presented by Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan to parliament on August 24, 2026. According to Kyiv's intelligence assessment, this indicates that Moscow faces the threat of losing one of its most important strongholds in the South Caucasus.
Two different motivations, the same structure
From an analytical point of view, the situation can be formulated as follows. Russia tries to keep Armenia through pressure tactics, not wanting to "lose" it, while Europe strives to attract Armenia into its orbit precisely by using this pressure. The instruments of both sides are different (Moscow uses military base, energy prices and trade restrictions as leverage, Brussels uses financial aid and market access), but the strategic framework is the same. Armenia is no longer perceived as a neutral, "stuck in the middle" state. It appears as the next testing ground for geopolitical polarization. And this thesis is now confirmed in parallel by Yerevan itself, Moscow, and the media in Brussels and Washington.
It is true that it would be premature to say that there will be an exact repeat of the Ukrainian scenario here. The context is different. Armenia is not on the verge of NATO membership. But the structural similarity is undeniable. The same "either-or" choice logic, the same cycle of economic pressure-compensation, the same official rhetoric (warning of "catastrophic consequences" from Moscow, promise of "resolute support" from Brussels), and Putin himself has already voiced this by directly comparing it to Ukraine.
History shows that for small states caught in the lines of competition between major powers, "neutrality" is usually a temporary status. External pressure forces them to make a choice. Ukraine has gone through this path since 2014, and the result is known to all. The situation Armenia faces today, between Moscow's warning-filled offer of "freedom" and Brussels' financially supported "embrace," structurally resembles the initial stage of the same model. How it will end, as the Ukrainian experience has shown, will mainly be determined by internal political choice, the degree of societal consolidation, and the accidental factors of the international conjuncture. All these, as history has shown, are the most difficult equations to predict. In the formulation of this equation, Armenia's years of aggressive policy against Azerbaijan, and finally, Azerbaijan's liberation of its territories from occupation, have also played no small role.
Elnur AMIROV
