Questions about Russian President Vladimir Putin's political future and how power will be formed in the country after him are increasingly attracting attention. Given that Putin is 73 years old and has formed a political system based on personal power for many years, what will happen after his departure from the political scene remains uncertain.
Modern.az, citing "Foreign Affairs", reports that one of the main problems with a possible transition of power in Russia is not so much about Putin himself, but about the future of the older political elite that has formed around him.
It is noted that Putin has created a dense network of loyal individuals to consolidate his power and maintain political stability. However, this system has also limited the entry of new generations into high politics, their gaining trust within the government, and their accumulation of the necessary experience to govern the country in the future.
As a result, a serious problem may arise in Russia's intergenerational political transition. The likelihood of younger officials, even the children of high-ranking officials in Putin's inner circle, rising to higher positions, bypassing politicians who are currently in their 50s and 60s and consider themselves candidates for future leadership, is increasing.
Older elite around Putin
The article emphasizes that most of the individuals leading the main political and security structures around Putin are quite old.
Among them are Alexander Bortnikov, director of the Federal Security Service, Sergey Naryshkin, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Alexander Bastrykin, chairman of the Investigative Committee, Viktor Zolotov, head of the Russian National Guard, Sergey Shoigu, secretary of the Security Council, and Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff.
The author believes that Putin relies on his close relationships with individuals he has trusted for many years to maintain control over the political system. This has limited the access of the new generation of political elite to the main centers of power.
Comparison with Stalin
The article also compares Russia's possible power transition with the processes that occurred in the Soviet Union after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953.
After Stalin's death, as there was no single heir to power, a long-term struggle began within the Soviet elite. Although Georgy Malenkov was formally considered Stalin's successor, he did not have sufficiently strong political support.
In the subsequent period, influential figures such as Lavrentiy Beria, Vyacheslav Molotov, Nikita Khrushchev, Kliment Voroshilov, and Georgy Zhukov became the main participants in the struggle for power. As a result, Khrushchev gradually gained an advantage and took full control of power in 1957.
According to the author of the article, as in that period, after Putin, in addition to formal constitutional mechanisms, it is possible that the fate of power will be determined by a narrow circle with strong positions and personal connections in the main state institutions.

Who might emerge after Putin?
The article mentions several individuals among the possible successors after Putin.
These include Aleksey Dyumin, 53, Secretary of the State Council and former pguard of Putin, Vyacheslav Volodin, 62, Chairman of the State Duma, Mikhail Mishustin, 60, Prime Minister, and Sergey Kiriyenko, 64, First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration.
However, the author believes that the long-term obstruction of intergenerational transition in the Russian political system has led to a number of potential leaders in their 50s and 60s being excluded from the main centers of power.
Another notable point is the rapid rise of the children of the older elite to high positions. The article notes that the son of former Presidential aide Nikolai Patrushev, the son of billionaire banker Yuri Kovalchuk, and one of Putin's younger relatives have been appointed to high state positions.
According to the author, this situation could increase dissatisfaction within the Russian political elite and deepen intergenerational confrontation.
"Chaos is possible after Putin"
One of the main risks mentioned in the article is an unplanned and sudden transition of power.
It is stated that in such a situation, individuals who have insufficient connections with the current ruling elite, have not gained their trust, and have weak experience in controlling state institutions may come to the forefront. This could further intensify the struggle for power.
The author believes that the long-term presence of the older elite at the head of the main state institutions in Putin's political system reduces the likelihood of an orderly power transition in the future.
"The longer the older elite remains in power at the highest levels of the Putin regime, the more difficult it may be for an orderly transition to the next president to occur," the article emphasizes.
Thus, the main issue in Russia is not only when Putin will leave power, but to whom and by what mechanism power will pass after him. The absence of a clear succession mechanism in the existing system and the long-term control of key positions by the older political elite increase the likelihood of a serious internal struggle for power in the future.