After the memorandum of understanding was signed between the US and Iran on June 17, further negotiations were held in Doha on July 1, mediated by Qatar and Pakistan.
At the end of the meetings, working groups were established. At the same time, the US increased its military presence in the region by sending the USS Boxer amphibious group to the Middle East. Representatives of the Donald Trump administration openly state that the current period is considered an opportunity to further strengthen Washington's positions until the next stage of negotiations.
It is precisely the parallel conduct of diplomacy and military pressure that causes increasing concern in Tehran. Iran believes that after the war, it has been able to maintain four main levers of influence: the ability to affect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, keeping the Lebanon issue within the framework of a ceasefire agreement, continuing uncertainty around the nuclear program, and gaining economic advantages, including the creation of a $300 billion investment fund. However, according to Iranian analysts, Washington is trying to weaken each of these levers in stages, bringing Iran to the final negotiations in a weaker position.
This strategy is most clearly demonstrated around the Strait of Hormuz. For Tehran, the main issue is not the imposition of transit fees, but the acceptance that the security of shipping is already inseparable from Iran's interests. However, the creation of an alternative route through Oman's internal waters, the support of the Persian Gulf countries for the freedom of maritime transport, and steps taken towards restoring normal maritime traffic without Iran's participation are gradually reducing the importance of this lever.
The processes around Lebanon are similarly evaluated in Tehran. Separate negotiations on the Israel-Lebanon line are perceived by Iran as an attempt to separate the Lebanon issue from US-Iran agreements and to limit the possibilities of using "Hezbollah" as an element of a broader political deal. In addition, Persian Gulf countries link future investments and economic cooperation with Iran's abandonment of support for its regional allies. Tehran believes that this expands the agenda of the negotiations beyond the framework of the initial memorandum.
The direction of the nuclear program also remains one of the main topics. Iran continues to restrict IAEA inspectors' access to damaged nuclear facilities. Tehran believes that information about the location and status of highly enriched uranium reserves is still an important negotiating tool. Iranian officials fear that premature disclosure of this information could lead to the loss of a key advantage before issues related to sanctions relief and security guarantees are resolved.
Military incidents in recent weeks also increase concern. Mutual strikes between the US and Iran on June 26-28, the deployment of new American forces to the region, and statements by representatives of the Trump administration have led to the formation of an opinion in Tehran that Washington is using the period of the memorandum's validity to strengthen its positions and test Iran's "red lines." In particular, the possibility of limited US strikes on Iranian territory gradually becoming commonplace without escalating into a large-scale war causes serious concern.
Under such circumstances, Tehran tries to continue the diplomatic process, while at the same time trying to avoid concessions that could lead to the loss of remaining levers of influence. The most realistic strategy is considered to be conducting negotiations in parallel with limited pressure, primarily by maintaining influence in the Strait of Hormuz, preserving uncertainty around the nuclear program, and attempting to keep the Lebanon issue within the overall package of agreements.
At the same time, pressure from conservative political circles within the country seriously limits the Iranian leadership's opportunities for compromise.
From Tehran's perspective, diplomacy has already become a continuation of the struggle to preserve the strategic advantages gained as a result of the war. The main question for Iran is: will the country be able to preserve enough levers of influence for the final agreement to be in its interests?
